















We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number 
of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect 
with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good 
and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the 
possibility of social networks to be used and institutional devices to create the 
same behavioral responses we observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, 
social norms, reciprocity, trust, shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperative 
behavior in the private provision of public goods. The results of our experiment 
suggest that the structure of the network affects the players’ ability to communicate 
–and through it, their cooperation levels–, and also their willingness to engage in a 
more costly type of collective action, namely the endogenous creation of new links 
to individuals previously out of reach. Finally, the information flows in the network 
seem to reduce uncertainty in the players: players with more links tend to have 
more stable play strategies. 
 
Keywords: Social capital, social networks, collective action, cooperation, VCM, 
experiments, public goods provision, information flows. 
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Presentamos un nuevo diseño de un experimento de bienes públicos simplificados 
para un número grande de jugadores, donde hasta 80 personas en el laboratorio 
tienen la posibilidad de comunicarse con otros jugadores para inducir más 
contribuyentes al bien público y así solucionar el dilema social. Este diseño 
experimental explora la posibilidad de que las redes sociales y mecanismos 
institucionales creen las mismas respuestas de comportamiento que se observan 
con pequeños grupos (e.g. compromisos, normas sociales, reciprocidad, 
confianza, pena y culpa), que al parecer inducen el comportamiento cooperativo 
en la provisión de bienes públicos. Los resultados de nuestro experimento 
sugieren que la estructura de la red afecta de un lado la posibilidad del jugador de 
comunicarse, y de otro su disposición a involucrarse en acciones colectivas más 
costosas –la creación endógena de nuevas conexiones con individuos que 
inicialmente fuera de su alcance en la red. Finalmente, el flujo de información en la 
red parece disminuir la incertidumbre que enfrentan los jugadores: jugadores 
mejor conectados tienden a tener estrategias de juego más estables.  
 
Palabras clave: Capital social, redes sociales, acción colectiva, cooperación, 
VCM, experimentos, provisión de bienes de públicos, flujos de información. 
 
Clasificación JEL: C92, D7, D85, H4.  
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Introduction: Cooperating in large groups and making use of 
social networks 
 
Many public goods need to be produced by, and/or benefit, large number of individuals 
(tax compliance, charities, global warming, air pollution in cities). Public goods are difficult 
to produce through voluntary contributions because of the divergence between individual 
and collective interests and the free-riding problem. This has been widely studied 
experimentally by economists and social psychologists using the so called Voluntary 
Contribution Mechanism (VCM) and a there is now a vast amount of experimental data on 
the factors that trigger contributions, including the material and non-material incentives, 
social norms, information available, etc.  
 
However, most of this literature is based on experiments conducted in rather small groups 
of 3 to 5 people. Very little experimental evidence exists for experiments with more than 10 
players
4. For a typical linear public good problem, as group size increases the gap 
between the returns from not contributing and contributing also increases, for a given 
number of contributors. On the other hand, the larger the group, the more difficult is to 
gather information on the critical mass or minimum number of contributors required for any 
player to be indifferent between contributing or not to the public good. 
 
In such setting –a large group that needs contributions for the provision of the same public 
good– what is the role of a social network through which information can flow? 
 
We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of 
players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with 
others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and 
overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the possibility of social 
networks to be used and institutional devices to create the same behavioral responses we 
observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, social norms, reciprocity, trust, commitment, 
shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperative behavior in the private provision of public 
goods. 
                                                 
4  An  exception  is  the  work  conducted  by  Isaac  and  Walker  in  the  1990s  with  groups  of  40  to  100  people.  Also 
Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2005) run experiments with 16 players.  
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We have 80 people in a computer lab to play the following game for actual money: each 
player receives a token that can be kept in a private account or invested in a group 
account. The decision is made individually, in private and confidential. Only the group 
outcome will be announced at the end of the game. The incentives are simple: If you keep 
the token you get 10 USD for it. Also, you will get, regardless of keeping or investing it, 
0.25 USD for each token that is invested in the group account by the group of 80 players. 
 
Therefore, your total earnings at the end ($10 or $0) + ($0.25 x Sum.Tokens invested by 
the group). We have thus a social dilemma where the Nash equilibrium is that nobody 
contributes, and you produce 80 x $10 = $800 of social efficiency. The social optimal is 
that every one contributes and could yield 80 x $0.25 x 80 = $1600 instead.  
 
In a first baseline round our participants can decide whether to invest in the private o group 
account without any possibility to communicate with others in the group. The outcome of 
this round is not announced to the players until the end of the experiment. We then 
proceed to the more interesting part of our experiment in the next round of the game.  
 
Before she chooses her action, each player can write (not talk) to some of the others using 
one-on-one chat software. We control who can talk to whom and keep the logs of the 
written communication. The contacts are anonymous: no player is allowed to know the 
identity of her counterparties. We thus control the structure of the network and have 
access to the content of the communication. In a third round of the game we again allow 
the players to communicate through the one-on-one chat rooms, but this time they can 
acquire addresses of other parties so that they can endogenously create more links with 
more players in their session. 
 
The results of our experiment suggest that the structure of the network affects the outcome 
of the game in several ways. Firstly, and trivially, it directly relates to the extent of 
communication feasible among players. The players seem to use this feasible 
communication channels in a uniform manner, so availability and use of connections are 
closely correlated. Secondly, we confirm that the communication itself is crucial in 
understanding the level of cooperation in the group.  
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Thirdly, we find that the local connectivity structure of the network has an important role as 
determinant of the willingness of the players to engage in a more costly type of collective 
action, namely the endogenous creation of new links to individuals previously out of reach. 
Investment in creating new links seems to accord to some law of diminishing returns. 
However, these returns are not in terms of the game at hand, for the new links do not 
increase overall cooperation in the game.    
  6 




The concept of social capital has faced some resistance by mainstream economics, in part 
because there is no consensus about its definition. At least two views exist. On one side, 
social capital is viewed as the array of social networks that exist in a community and that 
can be used by individuals both for private uses and for coordination in collective action. 
The other view regards social capital as a widespread willingness of individuals to trust 
other individuals based on prior beliefs. Since both concepts of social capital are difficult to 
quantify, empirical testing to ascertain their relevance is always controversial.
5  
 
This paper is built on the idea that both views are correct and complement each other, but 
also that they miss an important additional element, which we call transferability. Social 
capital consists of a set of underlying community networks that can be used by individuals 
for private or public benefit. To be used effectively for public good production, these 
networks have to be associated with a “trust endowment”, i.e. the individuals in it must be 
willing to trust its other members a priori. In principle, however, this trust endowment is 
purpose specific: a social network that is effective to mobilize people for an environmental 
initiative may not be useful to organize an anti-war rally. Thus the social network is a sort 
of communication infrastructure that is only useful if a specific type of trust is present –a 
production technology for public goods. Only if this trust is transferable, i.e. if it is possible 
to use it for provision of other public goods, the social network becomes true social capital. 
 
The communication infrastructure is the first element of social capital, and in a sense it is a 
prerequisite for the other two. The effect of network parameters on the onset and outcome 
of collective action –particularly large-scale collective action– is likely to be non-linear and 
feature emergent properties.
6 In particular, local network structure probably determines 






  7 
whether small-group behavior appears among clusters of individuals, but it also affects 
how quickly information spreads and which emergent properties can appear upon 
aggregation. 
 
The role of the network structure is not only one of communication, however. In an 
important sense, the structure may also influence its members’ prior beliefs about (i) the 
network itself and (ii) the characteristics of the other individuals in it. Both affect the 
likelihood of success of collective action, and the willingness of the individuals to engage in 
it. 
 
The individual beliefs about the likelihood of success of collective action depend on the 
beliefs about the connectivity of the network, which is a network-wide parameter, not easily 
observable by its individual members. How do these beliefs about connectivity relate to the 
true connectivity? If, as seems plausible, the individuals form their beliefs using information 
about their immediate neighbors, then local network structure is also relevant for the 




Similarly, an individual’s beliefs about the characteristics of other network members may 
be driven in part by what she sees in her neighbors.
8 Thus, the number of neighbors is the 
sample size upon which those beliefs are formed, and it affects their accuracy. 
 
Trust is the second element of social capital. To some extent, the willingness of an 
individual to trust somebody in a network is driven by a sense of a common interest. Thus 
membership in an environmental network presumable informs about an interest in matters 
environmental, but not about your views on foreign policy. In this sense, a network is like a 
club, and being in it signals private information about preferences. 
 









  8 
However, common interest cannot be the whole story. For a network to act effectively as a 
cooperation device, the potential free-riding members must be deterred. The literature on 
cooperation suggests a number of ways for this to happen, relying usually on the 
observability of free-riding, repeated interaction and non-anonymity of the players. 
Alternatively, there is the idea of strong reciprocity: a predisposition of the network 
members to cooperate and to punish those who don’t, even at a personal cost. This is 
what we call the trust endowment of the social network. 
 
A social network like this is not yet social capital. Or better, it is specific social capital, not 
applicable for general purposes and limited in scope –very much like a club. A final 
element is required for the network to constitute true social capital. The network and its 
trust endowment must be applicable to uses different from those it was initially intended to 
serve.
9 That is, it must be transferable to some extent to a different context –it must be 
flexible enough to allow for other collective action goals.  
 
The inferred characteristics of the network members are relevant for transferability. To the 
extent that they are correlated with other characteristics, the information is useful for other 
collective action initiatives. So, if this is a successful environmental network, and if being 
environmentally minded is correlated with being on the political left, the network members 
may infer that this social network is transferable to leftist political action. Again, the degree 
of transferability may be inferred from –or even tested on– the immediate neighbors.  
  
On the structure of social networks 
 
The social network is thus important as a means of communication, but it also carries 
information that allows its members to form priors about the characteristics of its members 
and the likelihood of success of collective action. Thus, its structure, both global and local, 
is important to understand the determinants of the emergence and eventual success of 
collective action. 
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The literature on social networks is large. Starting with graph theory in mathematics, the 
study of global (topological) features of networks has evolved to become an 
interdisciplinary program with numerous applications (Barabasi, 2003; Dorogovtsev y 
Mendes 2003, Ch. 1).  
 
One can think of a graph as consisting of a set of elements called vertices and a set of 
elements called edges. Each edge is in turn a pair of vertices. It is useful to visualize this 
as points (the vertices) joined by lines (the edges), as in Figure 1. Thus, the edge {x,y} 
joins the vertices x and y. A random graph is one where the edges are chosen randomly 
with some probability from the universe of all possible pairs {x,y}. Exactly how they are 
chosen is determined by the particular model used.  
 
Several concepts developed in the context of random graphs are useful for our purposes. 
The degree of a vertex is the number of edges that attach to it. So, for example, the vertex 
35 in Figure 1 has a degree of 4. The degree of the graph, on the other hand, is the 
average degree of its vertices, and it is a first approximation to how well-connected the 
vertices are. The graph in Fig.1 has a degree of 1.85. A path from vertex x to vertex y is a 
way to get from one to the other via the edges –in a sense, extended edges. There may be 
several such paths, or none. The path length is the number of edges the path has, and the 
minimum path between two vertices is the shortest path that joins them. 
 
In each experimental session in this paper, each link was assigned randomly with a 
constant probability, so the associated graph is a uniform random graph. Graph theory 
was originally concerned with precisely this type of graph (Erdös and Rényi 1959): they 
have a relatively homogenous structure (with analytical results in the limit of many 
vertices). Notably, the degree distribution of links among vertices is of the Poisson type, 
which means that the number of vertices with large degrees is relatively small –they are 
thin-tailed. Poisson-type degree distributions are indeed a robust feature of random 
graphs. 
 
In the last ten years, however, empirical evidence about real networks has shown at least 
three features that run counter to random graphs. First, their degree distribution often 
follows power laws, which means they are fat-tailed, i.e. that many vertices have large 
degrees (the so-called hubs). This is the case of some social networks, the internet and  
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the WWW.
10  Second, the average path length between pairs of vertices is relatively small. 
This is the small-world effect. The third feature is clustering, that is, groups of vertices that 
are highly interconnected among them –Harry knowing Sally and Sally knowing Marie 
makes is very likely that Harry knows Marie.
11 
 
These empirical findings have introduced dramatic changes to the perceived global 
features of networks, but they have also brought attention to their local (or micro) structure. 
Intuitively, hubs and clustering are local features that fit well with several popular ideas in 
social networks.
12 But they are appealing in a dynamic sense as well. To the extent that 
the creation of links in social networks is endogenous and non-random, individuals could 
be expected to reinforce clustering and hubs. If I need to find a business partner in a new 
environment, I’ll probably go to a visible community member (i.e. link myself to a hub, thus 
adding a link to her rolodex), who will connect me to some other person with similar 
interests –one of the roles of prominent political figures. To the extent that this person 
introduces me to others in this community, I will add to a cluster. 
 
Small path lengths, on the other hand, are a global feature of the network, and thus more 
difficult to observe for individual network members. They may be, however, related to 
hubs. The literature has shown that an effective way to reduce the path lengths in a 
lattice
13 is to introduce shortcut links randomly. To the extent that these long-distance 
connections link individuals who are otherwise separated in society, they may correspond 
to acquaintance connections. 
 
In the context of collective action, both the global and the local features of networks are 
likely to be relevant. The degree of the social network probably affects the chances of 
success, in particular for large-scale collective action, where the existence of a giant 
component may be necessary.
14 Clustering and hubs, on the other hand, may be relevant 







none  of  its  elements  is  connected  to  any  other  element  of  the  graph  outside  the  component.  Thus 
components are islands of vertices. The size of the largest component in the graph, relative to the graph 
itself, is a well‐studied feature of graphs. For some graphs, the expected size of the largest component is  
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for success in small-scale cooperation –and they may also affect the likelihood that a giant 
component exists. And, as we argued above, clustering and hubs may also affect the 
priors of the network members about the global features of the network. The experiment 
presented in this paper allows us to examine the relevance of some of these channels. 
 
 
An experimental design for exploring collective action in 
large groups. 
 
We are concerned with social interactions within large groups that act in a decentralized 
manner, that is, with no central planner or device to coordinate the actions of the 
members. However, we are focusing on a setting where all group members are engaged 
in the same production process.
15 In particular, we are interested in social interactions 
immersed in a process of production of a public good, that is, a good that is non-
excludable and non-rival, and therefore difficult to provide through voluntary contributions. 
Because the private cost of contributing to the public good is higher than the private return 
from the public good, there are no individual (Nash) incentives to contribute. However, at 
the social optimum, all players would be better off if all players had contributed. This is the 
case of a typical N-prisoners dilemma or any social dilemma where individual and group 
interests are in conflict. 
 
In the context of our study, we have adapted the conventional version of the public goods 
provision game or Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) for the context of our 
research question. We created a setting for 60-80 players who face the choice of 
contributing or not to the same pure public good, that is, every player will receive the same 
amount of the public good provided regardless of having contributed or not. Secondly, we 
simplified the action set for the players to a dichotomous choice of investing one token to 
the private account (not contributing) or to the group account (contributing). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
vanishingly small compared to the graph itself. In contrast, other graphs exhibit a giant component, i.e. a 
component that is unique and of the same order of magnitude of the graph itself. 
15  Most  experimental  designs  that  involve  networks  settings  and  cooperation  situations  involve  simultaneous  two‐
person interactions of prisoners’ dilemmas or coordination games.  
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The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) 
 
In our design each player i of m players have a choice set of two options,  {} 1 , 0 = i x  keep 
or contribute a token to a public account. If the token is kept it yields a payoff of p to player 
i only. If the token is invested in the public account it yields a payoff of a to every player j 












j i i x a x p y
1
1   
If we analyze the ratio of the marginal return from the private account to the marginal 






























This is the MPCR (Marginal per Capita Return of the public account to the private account) 
as defined by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984). As long as the MPCR < 1, there will be 
no incentives to contribute to the group account and therefore the Nash strategy will be 
0 =
nash
i x . In such case each player obtains p yi = , and the group outcome would be
mp yi = ∑ . 
Basically each token in the group account implies a foregone income of (p-a) given that no 
contract has been written between i and the rest of the players. However if every player 
where to contribute to the group account,  m i x
opt soc
i , , 1 , 1
. = ∀ = , the social optimum is 
obtained. In this case the earnings for each player are  ma yi = , and the group outcome 
would be  mp p m yi > = ∑
2 .  
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In our particular design, we recruited a maximum number of m=80 players
16. Our 
parameters for the experiment were p=$20,000 (~US$10) and a=$500 (~US$0.25). That 
is, our MPCR=0.025, quite low for most VCM designs reported in the experimental 
literature (Ledyard, 1995), but rather realistic if one thinks of the cost of cooperating for a 
large group problem of collective action and the benefits accrued by the beneficiaries. 
Notice that if 40 players were to contribute to the public account, the payoff to any player 
from the public pot would be equal to the value of her own private token. Keeping the 
private token is a dominant strategy, but if she were to contribute she would get an amount 
at least equal to what she could have secured with certainty. For 80 players, therefore, the 
critical mass would be of 50% of players. Further, for any group size larger than 40 
players, the configuration of p=20,000 and a=500 would guarantee that this is a social 
dilemma. Given the difficulty to recruit large numbers of subjects, this design has the 
advantage of maintaining the MPCR constant regardless of the number of players as long 





Each of our sessions was conducted in the following manner. A maximum of 80 people 
were recruited to attend a session in a large computer lab. In each session the participants 
had been recruited from an undergraduate large class, and were told that their 
participation was voluntary, and that their decisions were confidential. The students 
participating came from different majors and years and thus we expected that they knew 
only a fraction of other students in the experiment. Once in the lab, they were seated in a 
random manner along the lab and were asked to maintain silence throughout the 
experiment. 
 
The monitor asked every participant to read the screen with the instructions. In the 
instructions they were told that the game will be played for 3 rounds and that at the end, 5 
people would be chosen randomly to receive the amount earned in cash. They were told 
the number of people attending the session as well as the incentives from investing the 
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token in the private account or in the group account. The appendix to the instructions 
included examples of possible actions and outcomes. The three rounds were as follows: 
 
Round 1: The players were asked to make the decision to invest the token in the private or 
group account, in private and confidentially. Once made, the monitor collected all decision 
cards privately. They were told that the total number of tokens in the group account would 
not be announced but until the end of the experiment. 
 
Round 2: Before the decision for round 2 was made, the participants were allowed to 
communicate for 10 minutes with some of the other players using the Yahoo! Messenger 
active in the screen of their computers. To do this, they received a list of Yahoo accounts 
of other players present in the lab, and they were informed that they could establish a one-
on-one chat conversation with any other player included in their list of contacts
18 if they 
wished. The Yahoo accounts were created in advance and were already registered in 
each particular computer. Since the accounts were created and assigned in a random 
fashion, this chat conversation was anonymous. They were explicitly asked not to open 
chat conversations with other contacts different from the ones given by the experimenter, 
but they could open as many one-to-one chat windows with those in the list of other 
accounts provided. They were told in the instructions that the chat conversations were 
being recorded in each computer under that Yahoo! account, and that such conversation 
was to remain confidential. When the 10 minutes concluded, they were asked to stop the 
chat conversations and proceed to write down their decision to invest the token in the 
private or group account, once again in private. The monitor then proceeded to collect the 
new decision cards. The total number of contributions to the group account was not 
announced either. 
 
Round 3: The third round proceeded very similarly to round 2. However, the instructions 
this time included the possibility that the players collected other Yahoo! accounts from 
other contacts– that is, they could increase the number of links and establish chat 
conversations with more players in the room. To do this, they were explicitly allowed to ask 
their existing contacts for more Yahoo! accounts and to establish more chat conversations 
                                                 
18 See Table 2 for the assignment of links in each of the 4 sessions reported here. Each row in Table 2 shows the number 
of people who received that number (degree) of other accounts with whom they could connect.   
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if they wanted. Except for that, every other aspect of the round was equal to the previous 
one. At the end of the new 10 minutes of chat conversations, they were asked to stop and 
make their new decisions for round 3. 
 
At the end of the three rounds the monitor announced the total number of tokens in the 
group account for each round, and each player could then calculate her own earnings. The 
monitor then proceeded to select the five players to be paid in cash. They proceeded to fill 
a short socio-demographic survey and wait in silence for the completion of the experiment 




We report here the results of 9 sessions conducted during the academic years of 2006 and 
2008 at the Universidad de Los Andes with 553 students from different disciplines and 
years.  
Descriptive statistics by groups 
 
We present descriptive statistics for each round and each group in Table 1. The session 
(group) size ranged between 42 players (group F) and 80 (group H). Group H has the 
highest average degree (3.925); group A has the lowest (0.6). In general, the actual 
(effective) degree of the groups is lower than planned due to non-attendance of recruited 
players reducing the net degree. For instance, both groups A and B were designed to have 
a degree of 1 if 80 players had shown up. As fewer players than expected showed up, we 
chose randomly among the available computers those that stayed empty, so that the 
network retained its uniform random graph structure. 
 
The resulting configuration of the experimental design is depicted in Fig. 2. Each point is a 
group-network: the effective degree is the average degree computed after the number of 
actual players and their locations in the net are known. With this sample we created 
enough variance and orthogonality in terms of group size and net degree. Figure 3 shows 
the individual player’s degree distribution when all groups are pooled. 98 players are  
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isolated, the rest have degrees between 1 and 9. Only eight players have degree seven or 
higher. 
The absence of some players in some sessions provided thus an additional source of 
variation in the experiment, one that was unexpected but not detrimental to our exercise. 
When the players decide if they’ll try to communicate with others, they have information 
about the links assigned to them, but they do not know whether a player is actually sitting 
on the other end (unless of course all players showed up). Thus we can test separately the 
effects of the prior information about links on the decision to communicate, and the effects 
of actually establishing communication on the later choices. 
 
The number of conversations in the second round –those that are constrained to the 
existing links– indicates a high use of the available links: over 75% in all cases and close 
to 100% in low connectivity groups. Link creation between rounds two and three is also 
abundant; it doubles the number of conversations in groups with low degrees. Group size 
does not seem to have any systematic relationship with communication. 
 
How much of all this translates into cooperation? As expected, cooperation was low in the 
first round, ranging from 6% to 19% (See Table 1). This is usual for the level of returns to 
contributing (low MPCR) and the lack of communication. Average network degree makes 
no difference in the first round either –just as well, since the players were unaware of the 
communication possibilities at this point (Fig 4). 
 
Also as expected, cooperation increases in the second round in almost all cases (Table 2 
and Figures 4 and 5); the exception is the least connected group. Average group degree 
does not obviously correlate with cooperation levels. Larger groups after a group size of 
about 50 players do cooperate more. Since they knew the group size from the beginning 
and the MPCR remained constant, we speculate that a larger group would increase each 
player’s expected absolute number of cooperators and via reciprocity increase the 
individual willingness to cooperate. 
 
The added links and extra conversations in the third round have no additional cooperation-
enhancing effect, however. The change in cooperation between rounds 2 and 3 is slightly 
positive in three cases and slightly negative in six. Why do people bother establishing new 
links if they will have little influence on their choices? This may be related to the  
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transferability of social capital that we discussed previously. People may consider the 
eventuality of a future situation where the new acquaintances may be of use. That is, they 
assign an option value to the new link. The future situation cannot possibly be in the 
context of the experiment, so this must be a heuristic strategy –a rule-of-thumb behavior: if 
you can cheaply make an acquaintance, get a phone number or an e-mail address, do so, 
even if you have no immediate use for it.  
 
Local network, willingness to communicate and the effect of 
communication on cooperation 
 
We turn now to the effect of the local (rather than the global) environment on individual 
actions. Figure 6 shows the link utilization ratio (conversations / exogenous links) and the 
new link ratio (new links / exogenous links). In the second round, on average, the players 
have conversations on roughly 80% of their exogenous links. In the third round the players 
with high degrees (hubs) still account for most of the new links, but the relationship is less 
than proportional. 
 
Having played G (cooperate) in the first round is correlated with higher cooperation in all 
rounds. Communication matters, too (or perhaps the existence of exogenous links, since 
they are closely correlated). While cooperation levels rise in the second round when 
communication is allowed, they rise more for people who chat more. Surprisingly, they 
also rise for isolated people –those who do not chat because they have no link.  
 
Meaningful play profile 
 
A player’s play profile is her sequence of choices in the three rounds. There are eight 
possible play profiles and they were all observed in the game: GGG, GGP, GPP, GPG, 
PGP, PGG, PPG and PPP. Fig 8 shows the distribution of play profiles among isolated 
and connected players. PPP was by far the most common play profile with over half of all 
players of either group, understandably because of the low MPCR in the game. This 
however gives us room for increases in cooperation through network mechanisms. 
  
  18 
To understand the profiles, it helps to construct plausible narratives of why a player may 
make certain choices, and how they may relate to the information she acquires during the 
experiment. The first round choice cannot depend on the communication network as the 
players did not know of the possibility to communicate with others. The actions in the first 
round may reflect some underlying player characteristic (altruism or egoism, optimism with 
regard to cooperation) or common information, like group size and the MPCR. As a player 
gathers information through conversations, she may reaffirm her choice or change her 
actions. If the information is more or less consistent, one may observe a steady profile 
(GGG or PPP)
19 or a monotonic one (GGP, GPP, PGG, PPG), depending on whether the 
new information confirms or contradicts the initial choice. Of course, the interpretation of 
the information may vary across players. We will say that a profile becomes cooperative if 
it starts with P in the first round and ends with G in the third. Conversely, it becomes non-
cooperative if it starts with G and ends with P.  
 
Non-monotonic profiles (GPG and PGP) suggest that the player was close to undecided in 
the first round, got mixed signals when conversing, or both. We treat them separately.  
 
With this manner of interpretation, Fig. 9 shows the distribution of “meaningful play 
profiles”, i.e. play profiles grouped according to the narratives above, by individual player 
degree. We group the profiles in steady cooperative (GGG), steady egoistic (PPP), 
increasingly cooperative (PPG, PGG), increasingly egoistic (GGP, GPP) and non-
monotonic or mixed (GPG, PGP). 
 
Higher degrees decrease the frequency of steady egoistic and increasingly egoistic play 
profiles. They also increase the frequency of steady cooperative and increasingly 
cooperative ones. That is, higher degrees make people more cooperative, whether they 
started cooperating in round one or not. This is also illustrated in Fig. 7. Whatever 
information people get when they talk, it tends to make them more prone to cooperating. 
Particularly striking is the decrease in increasingly egoistic profiles between isolated 
players and those with at least one link. Isolation brings despair, apparently. 
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Mixed profiles also show interesting patterns. They are twice as common among players 
with one link than among those isolated, suggesting that the acquired information is indeed 
the cause of some switching in choices. Perhaps the player started with a prior that was 
contradicted by the one conversation she had. Consistent with the hypothesis that the 
switching reflects uncertainty, however, more links (and conversations) seem to eliminate 
it: mixed profiles disappear among players with high degree. Nevertheless, a question 
remains: why do 7% of isolated players play mixed profiles? For that matter, why do over 
one third of all isolated players switch action at some point? What kind of information leads 
them to revise their choice? 
 
Leaving aside the possibility of randomization, the matter of isolated players switching 
choices suggests that some information does become available to them between rounds. 
The only candidate we can think of is the aggregate level of communication, reflected in 
the volume of typing-related noise in the room. However, since the isolated players cannot 
know what is being typed, it must be that they have priors about the content of the 
conversations. If so, those priors are evenly distributed, as the increasingly cooperative 
and the increasingly egoistic are roughly the same proportion among isolated players. This 
allows us to infer something about the informational content of the conversations. 
Assuming (plausibly) that such priors about the content of the conversations are 
uncorrelated with the degree of the players, the fact that increasingly cooperative profiles 
are much more common than increasingly egoistic ones among connected players, 
suggests that the content of the conversations (and not only their number) matters, and 
that it makes people update their priors in a manner that favors cooperation.
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Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we examine the private, decentralized provision of a public good through a 
VCM embedded in a social network. We study in different rounds of the game the 
determinants of two types of activism: communication with people, and endogenous 
generation of new connections among the members of the network. In the first round the 
network is exogenously imposed on the subjects –it does not arise through their choices–, 
so whenever observed behavior correlates with network characteristics, we are able to 
establish causality. Even in the second round, to the extent that new link creation is 
correlated with the original network characteristics, the direction of causality is clear. We 
also study the effectiveness of the two types of activism as means to improve the actual 
outcome of the VCM game.  
 
We use an experimental setting, adapting the conventional version of the public goods 
provision game or Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) for the context of our 
research question. We create a setting for 50-80 players who face the choice of 
contributing or not to the same pure public good –every player will receive the same 
amount of the public good provided regardless of having contributed or not. Secondly, we 
simplify the action set for the players to a dichotomous choice of investing one token to the 
private account (not contributing) or to the group account (contributing). Because the 
private cost of contributing to the public good is higher than the private return from the 
public good, there are no individual (Nash) incentives to contribute. However, at the social 
optimum, all players would be better off if all players had contributed. This is the case of a 
typical N-prisoners dilemma or any social dilemma where individual and group interests 
are in conflict. 
 
The results of our experiment suggest that the local structure of the network, measured by 
a player’s individual degree, influences her ability to communicate but not her willingness 
to do so. It does, however, increase her willingness to create new links to other players.    
 
As expected, the communication itself is crucial in explaining the level of cooperation in the 
group. However, it is the communication on exogenous links that makes a difference. The 
endogenously created new links do not seem to serve this purpose. Cooperation levels do 
not increase when the players create new links. We speculate that new links have an  
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option value, that is, they are built on the implicit expectation of eventual use, possibly in 
other settings.  
  
The manner in which links and conversations influence the players’ choices during the 
game suggests that there is information processing taking place. Players do seem to 
update some sort of prior as they have conversations, and to reduce their uncertainty with 
more conversations. Moreover, the content of the conversations seems to be pro-
cooperation, in the sense that updating is mostly towards more cooperation. 
 
Finally, the isolated players also do switch choices during the game, suggesting that they 
infer information from the overall level of communication, even if they do not know the 
content of that communication.  
 
We have studied in this experiment the effect of connectivity on (a) actual communication, 
(b) cooperation, (c) endogenous link creation and (d) information flows. It also provides us 
with additional, yet unexploited information about the demographics of the players and the 
characteristics and contents of the conversations, as well as higher order statistics of the 
network (which the literature suggests should be relevant). We expect that further research 
will allow us to establish whether these additional data explains the observed patterns of 
communication, activism and cooperation. In particular, we expect to estimate the effect of 
network clustering and hubs, on one side, and of the content of the conversations on the 
other.  
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Figure 1: A random graph 
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A  0.6  24  Round 1 0  52  6  12% 
   Round 2 24  52  4  8% 
   Round 3 22  52  6  12% 
     
B  0.75  30  Round 1 0  62  6  10% 
   Round 2 29  62  12  19% 
   Round 3 37  62  9  15% 
     
C  1.85  74  Round 1 0  68  9  13% 
   Round 2 72  68  23  34% 
   Round 3 138  68  28  41% 
     
D  0.75  30  Round 1 0  71  11  15% 
   Round 2 28  71  26  37% 
   Round 3 23  71  20  28% 
     
E  2.92  73  Round 1 0  50  4  8% 
   Round 2 59  50  10  20% 
   Round 3 87  50  8  16% 
     
F  1  25  Round 1 0  42  8  19% 
   Round 2 16  42  13  31% 
   Round 3 19  42  7  17% 
     
G  1.375  55  Round 1 0  48  3  6% 
   Round 2 38  48  9  19% 
   Round 3 68  48  14  29% 
     
H  3.875  155  Round 1 0  80  15  19% 
   Round 2 128  80  43  54% 
         Round 3 203  80  40  50% 
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Los implementos para comenzar la sesión son los siguientes: 
a.  Red de 80 computadores con acceso a Yahoo! Messenger 
b.  Cuentas de Yahoo! Messenger activadas y abiertas en cada computador 
c.  Página de instrucciones (html) abierta en navegador en cada computador 
d.  Números consecutivos del 1 al 80 para marcar computadores 
e.  Lista de cuentas de 80 Yahoo! Messenger 
f.  80 formatos de decisiones individuales 
g.  80 x 3 = 240 tarjetas de decisión individual 
h.  Hoja de asistencia-pagos 
i. 1  Protocolo 
j. 80  Consentimientos 
k.  80 recibos de pagos para que los participantes los firmen 
l.  Caja con dinero  





a.  El monitor debe recibir a los participantes en la mesa de entrada. En orden de llegada se le 
asigna un código a esa persona, se le entrega la tarjeta con su número, recordándole que durante 
el desarrollo del juego  ese va a ser su identificación, y que de ser posible no bote ese número. 
(Ver hoja de asistencia y pagos finales). Una vez termine de recibir a todos los participantes 
comenzar a llenar la hoja de redes. 
 
b.  Otro monitor va ubicando a las personas en orden de llegada en los computadores. 
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2. Comenzar  instrucciones 
a.  Finalmente cuando todos los participantes lleguen (Aproximadamente 80 participantes), el 
supervisor debe comenzar a leer las instrucciones generales.  
 
INSTRUCCIONES  
Experimento sobre redes de comunicación y  Provisión de Bienes Públicos 
Notas para el monitor del experimento: 
El diseño actual es para 80 personas.  
La decisión individual consiste en invertir una ficha en una cuenta privada o en una cuenta de 
grupo. La cuenta del grupo provee un bien público, proporcional a las fichas que se inviertan en 
ella.  
En concreto, los incentivos son los siguientes, en unidades monetarias $: 
•  Cada jugador tiene una ficha que debe invertir entre dos opciones: 
o  Una cuenta privada (P) que le genera una tasa de retorno fija 
o  Una cuenta grupal (G) que le genera una tasa de retorno dependiente del número 
de contribuciones del total de jugadores. 
•  Las ganancias del jugador dependerán de su inversión, de la siguiente manera: 
o  Si el jugador invierte la ficha en la cuenta privada (P) obtiene $20,000  
o  Cada jugador del grupo, sin importar en donde invirtió su ficha, recibirá $500 por 
cada ficha que haya sido invertida en la cuenta del grupo (G). 
En este diseño básico los jugadores toman sus decisiones de manera individual, confidencial y 
anónima. No pueden interactuar con otros jugadores antes, o durante el experimento, y sus 
ganancias y decisiones se mantendrán confidenciales por parte del monitor. Los jugadores tomarán 
decisiones en dos rondas y no sabrán el resultado de cada ronda sino hasta el final. 
Rondas: Una sesión de este juego constará de 3 rondas. En cada una de las rondas los jugadores 
deberán depositar en una caja una tarjeta que depende de si invierten su ficha en la cuenta privada 
(P) o en la cuenta de grupo (G). Esta misma decisión la irán registrando los monitores en las 
“Hojas de Decisiones”. El jugador no podrá calcular sus ganancias individuales totales sino hasta 
el final de la cada ronda donde el supervisor anunciará en el tablero el total de fichas invertidas en 
la cuenta de grupo (G).  
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En la segunda ronda de este juego, el supervisor anunciará que cada jugador tendrá la posibilidad 
de comunicarse con uno o más de los jugadores del grupo, antes de decidir cómo invertir la ficha 
en la próxima ronda. La comunicación se hace a través de el servicio de yahoo! Messenger 
instalado en las máquinas de la sala de computadores. Esta comunicación es totalmente voluntaria 
Los jugadores cuentan con 10 minutos para comunicarse. Al terminar el tiempo permitido, se 
suspenden las comunicaciones, y se procederá nuevamente a la decisión individual de inversión de 
su ficha en la cuenta privada (P) o en la cuenta del grupo (G). Estas decisiones seguirán siendo 
privadas y confidenciales. 
 
 
Para registrar esta decisión cada jugador tendrá una tarjeta, donde decide si invierte en “P” o “G”.  
Al final de las tres rondas, el monitor anunciará el total de fichas invertidas en la cuenta de grupo 
(G) en cada ronda para que cada jugador pase con un monitor y este último pueda calcular sus 
ganancias individuales en cada ronda y sus ganancias individuales totales.  
El monitor se encargará de realizar los pagos al finalizar todos los experimentos. 
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Juego de Inversión 
Instrucciones para los Participantes 
Gracias por participar en este experimento el día de hoy. El ejercicio se hará en una sola etapa con 
varias rondas de un juego. Por su participación Usted podrá ganar una cantidad considerable de 
dinero y por ello es importante que preste mucha atención a las instrucciones. La cantidad que se 
puede ganar depende de las decisiones que Usted y los demás participantes tomen durante el 
ejercicio.  
Al final del ejercicio vamos a escoger a 5 personas y les pagaremos sus ganancias en efectivo y de 
manera privada y confidencial.  
Usted va a hacer parte de un experimento en el que 80 personas en este salón tomarán 
decisiones, de manera individual, simultánea y en silencio. En este ejercicio Usted va a tomar 
decisiones en 3 rondas del juego. 
Cualquier decisión que usted tome durante este ejercicio será estrictamente confidencial. Para 
asegurar que sus respuestas sean confidenciales, le pedimos que no hable con nadie hasta que 
el experimento haya terminado completamente, de lo contrario, el experimento podrá ser 
cancelado.  
Decisiones: Al comienzo de cada ronda Usted tendrá disponible una ficha que podrá invertir en 
dos posibles alternativas o cuentas: 
￿         Cuenta Privada (P) 
￿         Cuenta de Grupo (G)  
Al comenzar la siguiente ronda Usted tendrá disponible una nueva ficha para invertir. 
Ganancias: De acuerdo a sus decisiones y las decisiones de los demás del grupo Usted podrá 
obtener una cantidad de unidades monetarias experimentales E$. Sus ganancias en cada ronda se 
calcularán de la siguiente manera: 
￿         Usted gana E$20,000 si invierte su ficha en la Cuenta Privada (P) 
￿         Por cada ficha que Usted y los demás del grupo inviertan en la Cuenta de Grupo (G) 
Usted obtendrá E$500  
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Al finalizar el juego completo elegiremos una de las tres rondas al azar y le pagaremos a las cinco 
personas seleccionadas el dinero en efectivo que obtuvo. Este pago se hará en privado y de 
manera confidencial. 
Cada uno de Ustedes va a decidir de manera individual y privada en donde invertir su ficha en cada 
ronda: (P) o (G). Esas decisiones serán registradas en las “Tarjetas de Juego” que serán recogidas 
por los monitores después de cada ronda, para contar el número de fichas invertidas en cada 
cuenta. Al final de las tres rondas, el monitor anunciará al grupo el total de fichas invertidas en la 
cuenta de grupo (G) durante cada ronda, y así, Usted podrá saber sus ganancias de acuerdo a su 
decisión, llenando las casillas de su “Hoja de Cuentas”.  
Ejemplos: Los siguientes ejemplos le pueden dar una idea de las posibilidades que tiene.  
￿         En una ronda Usted invierte su ficha en la cuenta privada (P), y después de sumar el 
total de fichas del grupo se anuncia que 65 fichas fueron consignadas en cuentas privadas 
(P) y 15 personas habían invertido en la cuenta de grupo (G). Por lo tanto sus ganancias 
son $20,000 por la ficha invertida en la cuenta privada y 15x$500, lo cual le da unas 
ganancias totales de $27500 
￿         En una ronda Usted invierte su ficha en la cuenta de grupo (G), y después de sumar el 
total de fichas del grupo se anuncia que 65 fichas fueron consignadas en cuentas privadas 
(P) y 15 personas habían invertido en la cuenta de grupo (G). Por lo tanto sus ganancias 
son 15x$500 = $7500. 
￿         En la ronda especificada Usted invierte su ficha en la cuenta privada (P), y después de 
sumar el total de fichas del grupo se anuncia que 25 fichas fueron consignadas en cuentas 
privadas (P) y 55 personas habían invertido en la cuenta de grupo (G). Por lo tanto sus 
ganancias son $20,000 + 55xE$500 = $47,500.  
￿         Usted invierte su ficha en la cuenta privada (P), y después de sumar el total de fichas 
del grupo se anuncia que 20 fichas fueron consignadas en cuentas privadas (P) y 60 
personas habían invertido en la cuenta de grupo (G). Por lo tanto sus ganancias son 
$20,000 por la ficha invertida en la cuenta privada y 60x$500, lo cual le da unas ganancias 
totales de E$50,000. 
Recuerde que todos en el grupo se benefician de igual forma de las fichas invertidas en la cuenta 
de grupo, pero solo Usted se beneficia de la ficha que invierte en la cuenta privada.   
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Hemos diseñado el ejercicio de manera que usted pueda tomar sus decisiones en privado y tal que 
nadie más conozca sus decisiones. Solo Usted sabe en cual cuenta invierte su propia ficha y 
ningún otro participante podrá ver esta información durante o después de finalizado el experimento. 
La única información que se da al grupo es el total de fichas invertidas al grupo. 
Es importante que usted entienda cómo funciona el ejercicio. ¿Hay alguna pregunta sobre cómo se 
procederá en el ejercicio? Si tiene alguna pregunta levante la mano y ésta será respondida por un 
monitor para todo el grupo. No consulte ni discuta las instrucciones o cualquier otro aspecto del 
juego con los demás participantes. 
Cuando se aclaren las preguntas pasaremos a la decisión de la primera ronda. 
  
Instrucciones segunda ronda del juego 
Antes de decidir cómo invertir la ficha en la próxima ronda, Usted tendrá la posibilidad de 
comunicarse con uno o más de los jugadores del grupo. Esta comunicación es totalmente 
voluntaria. Sin embargo debe permanecer en silencio durante el resto del experimento. Es 
absolutamente prohibido comunicarse verbalmente con los demás miembros del grupo. 
La única forma permitida de comunicarse con los demás del grupo, si lo desea, es usando la 
aplicación de Yahoo! Messenger© para chatear, y obviamente solo con aquellos cuya cuenta de 
Yahoo! le entregaremos. No es permitido obtener información adicional sobre las cuentas o 
contactos de otros destinatarios durante el experimento. 
La información que fluya en el Yahoo! Messenger será grabada en el computador bajo la cuenta 
asignada a Usted. Esta información es anónima y confidencial también. 
Ustedes cuentan con 10 minutos para enviar los mensajes que deseen. 
Al terminar el tiempo permitido, suspenderemos las comunicaciones, y procederemos nuevamente 
a la decisión individual de inversión de su ficha en la cuenta privada (P) o en la cuenta del grupo 
(G). Estas decisiones seguirán siendo privadas y confidenciales. 
A continuación le damos algunos detalles de cómo usar el Yahoo! Messenger. 
Instructivo de Yahoo! Messenger 
1.  Para ingresar al programa: inicio +programas + Yahoo! Messenger   
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2.  Para iniciar la sesión: En la ventana entrar (conectarse a Yahoo!) en ID: ingresar el nombre 
de la cuenta que le fue asignada y en  contraseña la contraseña asignada.  
3.  Para fines del experimento sus conversaciones serán gravadas, para verificar si esta 
opción esta activa:  
•  Messenger + preferencias+ En el cuadro categorías escoger la opción archivo +al  
lado derecho escoger la opción si, guardar mis mensajes. 
4.  Para agregar los contactos (dentro de este experimento solo podrás agregar los contactos 
asignados si no te fue asignado ningún contacto no podrás agregar ninguno en tu cuenta 
pero otras personas trataran de comunicarse contigo, los cuales serán los contactos con 
los que podrás hablar)  
•  Contactos + agregar contactos, en esta ventana  deberás escribir la dirección de 
correo de tu contacto+hacer clic en siguiente hasta que aparezca la opción 
finalizar  la cual debes seleccionar para terminar el proceso.  
5.  Para iniciar la comunicación con alguno de tus contactos:  
Haz clic con el botón derecho del Mouse en su nombre  y selecciona la opción enviar 
mensaje instantáneo, luego aparecerá un recuadro en el  que debes escribir lo que quieras 
decir  y seleccionar la opción enviar para que pueda ser leído por tu contacto.  
 
 
Instrucciones tercera ronda del juego  
Antes de decidir cómo invertir la ficha en la tercera ronda, Usted tendrá la posibilidad de 
comunicarse de nuevo con uno o más de los jugadores del grupo. Esta comunicación sigue siendo 
voluntaria. Sin embargo debe permanecer en silencio durante el resto del experimento.  
La única forma permitida de comunicarse con los demás del grupo, si lo desea, es usando la 
aplicación de Yahoo! Messenger para chatear. En esta nueva ronda Usted puede obtener 
información adicional sobre las cuentas o contactos de otros destinatarios durante el experimento. 
Si Usted quiere conseguir nuevas cuentas de Yahoo! para establecer nuevos contactos puede 
conseguirlas a través de otros jugadores y podrá establecer nuevas charlas. 
La información que fluya en el Yahoo! Messenger será grabada en el computador bajo la cuenta 
asignada a Usted. Esta información es anónima y confidencial también.  
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Ustedes cuentan con 10 minutos para enviar los mensajes que deseen. 
Al terminar el tiempo permitido, suspenderemos las comunicaciones, y procederemos nuevamente 
a la decisión individual de inversión de su ficha en la cuenta privada (P) o en la cuenta del grupo 
(G). Estas decisiones seguirán siendo privadas y confidenciales. 
Una vez terminadas las tres rondas del juego, procederemos a sumar las ganancias de cada 
jugador y haremos el sorteo de la ronda que se pagará y de los cinco estudiantes que recibirán sus 
ganancias en efectivo.  
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AC D E F G
Ronda
Total fichas en cuenta 
de grupo (anuncia el 
monitor)
Mis ganancias en la 
cuenta privada ($20.000 
si escogí P)
Mis ganancias en la 
cuenta de grupo 
($500 cada G)
Ganacia total individual 









Mi decisión (cuenta 
privada o cuenta de 
grupo)
No. de jugador No. de jugador No. de jugador
Ronda Ronda Ronda
Mi decisión PG Mi decisión PG Mi decisión PG
No. de jugador No. de jugador No. de jugador
Ronda Ronda Ronda
Mi decisión PG Mi decisión PG Mi decisión PG
No. de jugador No. de jugador No. de jugador
Ronda Ronda Ronda
Mi decisión PG Mi decisión PG Mi decisión PG
222
123
333
123
1
3
1
1
1
2